The "strong but silent" design of many decision support systems (DSS) has contributed to problems such as automation bias and trust miscalibration. The present study examined whether these difficulties can be overcome by providing continually updated information regarding a system's confidence in its own ability to perform its task(s) accurately and reliably. The application domain for this research was in-flight icing. Two groups of pilots flew a motion-based simulator in simulated icing conditions and were assisted by a neural net-based DSS that detected, and identified the location of, ice accretion. One group of pilots received information about overall system reliability only, whereas a second group was presented with a trend display of system confidence. Pilots in the latter group were better calibrated in terms of when to follow the system's advice. They were also more likely to reverse their actions when system-recommended actions were unsuccessful. Consequently, they experienced fewer icing-induced stalls. The findings from this research will be discussed in terms of their implications for the design of decision aids and for adaptive function allocation in human-machine teams.
INTRODUCTION
Automated decision aids have been introduced to a wide range of complex high-risk domains, including aviation, military command and control, medicine, and various industrial settings. The motivation for developing these (and other automated) systems was an expected reduction in operator workload and erroneous actions as well as improved reaction times of operators. Operational experience has shown, however, that the introduction of these systems has created some unexpected difficulties, such as automation bias and trust mis-calibration Moray, 1992, 1994; Muir, 1988; Parasuraman and Riley, 1997) . Automation bias refers to the "tendency to use automated cues as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing" (Mosier and Skitka, 1996) . This problem is sometimes the result of trust mis-calibration, i.e., a mismatch between the perceived and the actual system performance and capabilities. One of the factors that contribute to the above difficulties is the design philosophy underlying many decision support systems (DSS). They are often designed as prostheses, i.e., stand-alone systems that provide the user with solutions, rather than as a team-member who complements operators and supports them in arriving at a solution on their own (Woods and Roth, 1988) .
In some circumstances, such as high time pressure, a collaborative approach to decision-making may not be feasible. In those cases, the decision aid needs to provide input and recommendations to the user. Two implementations of such a system are the so-called status and command displays. Status displays present the operator with a diagnosis of the problem but leave the response selection to the operator. In contrast, command displays indicate to the operator what action should be taken in response to the problem, which is not necessarily communicated to the operator. By eliminating the need for diagnosis and/or action selection, prosthetic DSS tend to result in reduced response times to problems. However, the passive role assigned by such a system to its operators places them in a position where their only option is to implement the system-generated solution without having the time or information necessary to examine its validity on a case-by-case basis (Woods and Roth, 1988) .
Some authors have suggested that one possible method of improving this situation is to provide feedback on (changes in) the system's confidence in its own ability to perform its tasks correctly and reliably (Muir, 1988; Lee and Moray, 1994) . The present study examines whether continuously updated system confidence information can indeed reduce automation bias, improve trust calibration in, and task sharing with, an automated decision aid. The particular application for this experiment was decision making during in-flight icing encounters. In-flight icing poses a challenge to flight crews because ice can accrete in places that the pilot cannot see, such as the tail-plane, and it can develop slowly, giving only subtle cues to reveal its presence. To assist pilots in detecting and handling icing conditions, a Smart Icing System (SIS) is being developed jointly by the University of Illinois (Departments of Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering and Electrical and Computer Engineering) and The Ohio State University (Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering). The SIS is a neural network-based automated system that informs pilots about changes in aircraft stability and aerodynamic performance due to in-flight icing (Bragg et al, 1998) .
METHOD Participants
Thirty FAA Certified Flight Instructors (21 male and 9 female pilots) from the University of Illinois, Institute of Aviation, participated in this study. These pilots were between 19 and 47 years of age (mean = 25.2, SD = 5.90), and their total flight time varied between 275-2400 hours ( mean = 825, SD = 583). Participation was voluntary, and pilots received $12/hour and a $10 bonus for completing all three required sessions. In addition, the pilot in each group who had the best flight-path tracking performance received a $20 bonus.
Task
The pilots were asked to fly 28 scenarios on a motion-based simulator. Half of these scenarios simulated level cruise flight; the other half required the execution of an ILS approach. Each scenario lasted approximately eight minutes and involved either wing or tail-plane icing. The pilots were asked to respond to the icing condition and avoid stalling the airplane. Pilots were also required to monitor for possible system failures and comply with air traffic control clearances throughout the flight.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of three sessions, a onehour orientation and two 2-hour data collection sessions. During the orientation, the participants were briefed on the experimental tasks, the interpretation of the SIS indications, and the operation of the simulator. They were also instructed on how to recognize the onset of, and recovery from, iceinduced wing and tail stalls and were allowed to practice these techniques in the full motion simulator. Recovery from a wing stall consists of reducing pitch, increasing power and maintaining the current flap setting. Recovery from a tail stall involves the opposite: increasing pitch, reducing power and eliminating any flaps.
The pilots were then randomly assigned to one of two groups, fixed and updated. Pilots in both groups were informed that, overall, the SIS was approximately 70% accurate in diagnosing the location of the ice accretion. In addition, the update group was told that the neural net had been trained to recognize the cues related to both wing and tail icing and could derive a "confidence estimate" that indicated how closely current conditions matched previous icing data. The closer the match was, the higher the system's estimate and thus presumably the more trustworthy the DSS recommendations. This confidence estimate was presented on a trend display in the lower right hand corner of the screen. Each scenario began with a high confidence estimate which would then remain high, become low, or vary over time between the two extremes. These conditions corresponded to accuracy rates of 89%, 25% or 50% respectively.
In half of the trials, the pilots in both groups received a command display, which would indicate the recommended power, pitch and flap settings to avoid and recover from a stall. In the other half, they received a status display, which indicated only the location of the icing, thus leaving the recovery to the pilot.
RESULTS
The following sections report the findings from this study both in terms of one performance outcome measure (stall events) and in terms of several process measures, (i.e., pilots' strategies for monitoring the confidence trend display and their initial and subsequent responses to the decision aid recommendations).
Binary measures (e.g. stall incidents, compliance with system) were analyzed using logistic regression. The result of this analysis is expressed in terms of the odds ratio, which indicates the relative odds of the independent variable predicting a given value of the dependent measure. A value of one indicates independence and serves as a baseline for comparison.
Stall Events
A key indicator of performance was the number of stalls that occurred as a result of inappropriate responses to an icing event. Overall, significantly fewer stalls occurred in the update group, compared to the fixed group (see Table1) .
Factor
Condition Odds Ratio 95% CI Confidence display Fixed 2.01 1.36-2.95 Updated 1.00
Table 1: Effect of confidence information on stall incidence
An interaction effect between accuracy and confidence information indicates that the performance of the fixed group suffered significantly more from inaccurate information than the update group (see Figure 1) . Table 2 summarizes pilot's compliance with the DSS recommendations. A pilot's response was considered compliant if he/she performed two of the three actions (power, attitude and flap setting) that were suggested by the decision aid. Overall, the fixed group showed a tendency to follow the system advice more often than justified by its overall accuracy. In contrast, the update group complied at a rate below the system's actual accuracy in the high and variable conditions; in the low condition, their compliance rate was somewhat higher than the accuracy of the decision aid. We also analyzed whether pilots reversed their actions if their initial response to the icing condition was not successful (see Table 3 ). We found that pilots in the fixed group were not only more likely to initially comply with the decision aid than the update group, but also significantly more likely to remain anchored to their initial response, even when the outcome of their action suggested that the system advice was inaccurate. In contrast, pilots in the update group changed their response in 80% of the cases where it was appropriate to do so because of inaccurate system information. 
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Discussion
The present study was an attempt to develop and evaluate a countermeasure to the problems of trust miscalibration and automation bias that are often observed in the interaction of operators with automated decision support systems. It was assumed that continually updated information about a system's confidence in its own ability to perform its tasks accurately and reliably would help operators decide on a case-by-case basis whether to trust the system or whether to get involved in the task themselves.
Overall, the findings from this research suggest that this goal was achieved for the most part.
Pilots in the fixed group clearly showed signs of automation bias whereas most of the pilots in the update group were significantly less affected by this problem. In particular, the cost of inaccurate DSS information was significantly higher for the fixed group than the update group. Also, pilots in the update group were significantly more adaptive and flexible. They were ready to change their behavior if the system-recommended actions did not lead to success. This finding can be explained by the lack of information about moment-to-moment changes in the reliability of the DSS that made it impossible for the fixed group to determine whether the observed poor outcome of their actions was the result of temporary system unreliability or their own poor handling of the aircraft.
Pilots who received information about changes in system confidence adopted one of two strategies for deciding how to respond to the decision aid's recommendations. The first could be called a "contra" strategy in which the pilot, seeing that the reliability was unacceptably low, would invariably take the opposite, or contrary, action to what the DSS was recommending. This approach was afforded by the binary nature of, and response to, icing events (either wing or tail-plane icing) and shows a strong commitment to the validity of the reliability display information. Predictably, this approach tended to cause problems during those few cases in which the system indicated low reliability but was still correct in its assessment of the icing condition.
The second strategy could be referred to as "hedging". In these cases, at the first system indication of icing, the pilot would place the power setting at the boundary for wing and tail recovery and not commit to either recovery until further evidence was available. This suggests that the pilots were using the DSS indications as an "early warning" sign to alert them that some sort of icing event was occurring but then monitored and relied on the physical cues rather than the decision aid to make the final determination.
Overall, the findings from this study suggest that the presentation of system confidence information is a very promising approach to reducing automation bias and improve trust calibration and task sharing between human and machine. Still, many issues remain to be explored to ensure the success and robustness of this approach. For example, the pattern matching activities of neural networks enable these systems to gauge how closely current circumstances correspond to previously trained patterns, thus allowing them to compute a confidence rating. Rule-based decision aids use a different approach, and therefore a different method of deriving a confidence estimate will need to be developed.
Also, as discussed earlier, the limited solution space in this study allowed pilots to adopt certain strategies -such as doing the opposite of what an unreliable system was recommending, which would not be possible given a larger number of possible states and responses.
